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This paper investigates the long-term impact of Bangladesh’s Primary Education Stipend (PES) program 
on a range of individual and household welfare measures using a unique longitudinal study spanning the 
years 2000 to 2006. Using covariate and propensity score matching and difference-in-difference methods, 
the program is shown to have negligible impacts on school enrollments, household expenditures, calorie 
consumption, and protein consumption. At the individual level, the PES has a negative impact on grade 
progression, especially among boys from poor households who are ineligible to receive stipends at the 
secondary level. The program does, however, lead to improvements in height for age among girls and 
body mass index among boys. Nonetheless, the impacts of the PES are remarkably small for a program of 
its size. Poor targeting combined, in particular the program’s limited coverage and lack of geographical 
targeting, plus the declining real value of the stipend are the most plausible reasons for this lack of 
impact. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Education is known to be one of the key investments than can interrupt the intergenerational transmission 
of poverty (CPRC 2004). Since the late 1990s, there has been a wave of interest in educational transfer 
programs that provide cash and other incentives to poor parents who send their children to school (Parker, 
Rubalcava, and Teruel 2006; Fiszbein and Schady 2009). Bangladesh has some of the longest-running 
education transfer programs in the world, starting with the Food for Education (FFE) program in 1993, 
which predate the current wave of interest in educational transfer programs. This paper investigates the 
long-term impact of Bangladesh’s Primary Education Stipend (PES) program on a range of individual and 
household welfare measures using a unique longitudinal study spanning the years from 2000 to 2006. It is 
one of a series of comparative papers being written under the DFID-ESRC funded project “What 
Development Interventions Work? The Long-term Impact of Anti-poverty Interventions in Bangladesh,” 
led by the International Food Policy Research Institute. 
The next section sets the context with an overview of Bangladesh’s education transfer programs, 
after which the data and the evaluation methods used are described in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 
provides some descriptive (bivariate) analysis of the impacts of the PES program, while Section 6 
contains estimates of the impact of the programs on household- and individual-level outcomes using 
propensity matching. Section 7 concludes.   
2 
2.  OVERVIEW OF THE PES PROGRAM IN BANGLADESH 
The PES program aims to increase school enrollments and attainments by providing cash incentives for 
poor parents to send their children to school. Since mid-2002, households with qualifying pupils who 
attend school 85 percent of the time have received BDT100 per month for one child (about US$1.76
1
1.  belonging to a landless or near-landless household (one that owns less than half an acre of 
land); 
) and 
BDT125 per month for more than one child. To qualify for the program, children must be of primary-
school age and meet at least one of the following five eligibility criteria: 
2.  having parents who work as day laborers; 
3.  belonging to a female-headed household (one wherein the head is widowed, separated, or 
divorced or wherein the husband is disabled); 
4.  belonging to a household that derives its living from fishing, pottery, weaving, blacksmithing, 
or cobbling); or 
5.  belonging to a household that derives its income from sharecropping. 
The PES program replaced the FFE program in mid-2002. In 2002, the FFE program provided 
beneficiary households with a free ration of 15 kilograms of wheat or 12 kilograms of rice per month for 
sending one child of the appropriate age to primary school.
2
The PES program was rolled out in the period between July 2002 and January 2003.  
 The eligibility criteria for FFE were similar 
to those of PES except that children of sharecropping households were not entitled to receive food rations. 
However, unlike the PES program, which covers all rural areas, the FFE program was implemented 
selectively in economically disadvantaged rural union councils (administrative groups of villages) only. 
At its peak in 2002, FFE was implemented in 1,255 unions covering 27 percent of the country (Tietjen 
2003). The main reasons for the replacement of the FFE program were concerns about its cost, poor 
targeting, and geographic selectiveness, together with criticisms, probably inflated, about the high level of 
leakages from the program (Ahmed 2005). This led to a government decision in December 2001 to 
abandon the FFE program and a budget allocation for the stipend of BDT6.63 billion (approximately 
$120 million) in the June 2002 budget. A detailed account of the historical development of both the FFE 
and the PES programs is provided in the companion paper by Ahmed and Khondakar (2009). 
During the first phase of its implementation, from then until to 2007, the Ministry of Primary and 
Mass Education estimated that 5.5 million children received the stipend at a budgetary cost of BDT2.82 
billion (approximately $45 million). Al-Samarrai (2007) states that in 2004/05 almost a fifth (19 percent) 
of the primary education budget was spent on the PES program. 
The term of PES was extended by one year in 2007 and then renewed for a second phase in July 
2008 for a further five years (until June 2013). The budgetary allocation for the second phase of the PES 
program between 2008 and 2013 is BDT2.44 billion ($37 million), with 4.8 million children expected to 
benefit from the program (Ministry of Primary and Mass Education n.d.). 
Under the PES program, six designated national banks disburse the stipends on a quarterly basis 
to authorized parents/guardians on predetermined dates at the local bank branches or at temporary 
distribution points (“camps”) established within 5 kilometers of the school (Tietjen 2003). Stipends were 
disbursed to pupils’ parents or legal guardians on presentation of bank-issued identity cards (preference 
was given to mothers in the issuance of these identity cards). Due to the dramatic expansion of 
nongovernment primary schools in the late 1990s, the range of schools whose pupils were eligible to 
receive education transfers was also extended to include approved full primary schools run by NGOs. 
However, BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) community schools and other NGO 
                                                       
1 All dollars are U.S. dollars. 
2 If households had more than one primary school–age child and sent them all to primary school, the monthly ration was 
increased to 20 kilograms of wheat or 16 kilograms of rice (Ahmed and del Ninno 2002).  
3 
schools without the full range of grades (one to five) are excluded from the program. So too are all urban 
primary schools. This reflects the traditional political consensus that poverty is mostly a rural issue in 
Bangladesh, together with a desire not to encourage rural–urban migration (Al-Samarrai 2009).
3
School management committees with the assistance of head teachers are responsible for selecting 
children who meet the five eligibility criteria, who are expected to be from the poorest 40 percent of 
households (Tietjen 2003). The list of children selected to receive PES is then reviewed and approved by 
the upazila education officer and executive officer (Ahmed 2005).  
 
It is important to note that the nominal value of PES has been fixed at BDT100 for the first child 
and BDT125 for two or more children since its inception. Given inflation, this means that in real terms, 
the value of the monthly PES stipend has been declining since 2003. Put differently, BDT100 would buy 
11 kilograms of atta (wheat flour) and 7.5 kilograms of rice in late 2003 and 6.1 or 6.2 kilograms of 
wheat or rice in late 2006 (Figure 1).
4
Figure 1. The declining value of educational transfers 
 A similar calculation suggests that at the height of the food crisis in 
August 2008, PES would buy around 3.3 kilograms of wheat and 3.1 kilograms of rice. When these 
volumes are compared to 15 kilograms of wheat or 12 kilograms of rice that were provided as the 
monthly ration by the FFE program, it is clear that the value of educational transfers has declined 
substantially since the introduction of PES. 
 
Source: Author’s creation. 
Note: Kgs = kilograms; FFE = Food for Education; PES = Primary Education Stipend. 
The life history interviews that were conducted as part of the study (see next section) confirm that 
while the FFE and PES programs were seen as contributing positively to the life histories of 29 percent of 
individuals, the impact of the transfer was limited by the relatively low value of the benefits (Davis, 
forthcoming).  Only a small number of respondents reported that children might have been withdrawn 
from school without the transfers. 
                                                       
3 In addition, primary schools attached to higher-level madrasahs (Dakhil) are excluded from the PES program for 
administrative reasons (Al-Samarrai 2009).  
4 This calculation was made using the domestic wholesale market prices in Dhaka for November/December, quoted in the 
Food Policy Monitoring Unit’s quarterly Bangladesh Food Situation Reports (FPMU, various dates).  
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3.  DATA 
The data used in this paper come from a three-wave panel survey of 511 households in 8 upazilas 
(subdistricts) in rural Bangladesh, in which the same households were interviewed in 2000, 2003, and 
2006. The panel builds on an International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) evaluation of the 
impact of the FFE program conducted in 2000 (Ahmed and del Ninno 2002). In the first evaluation, 600 
households in 60 villages in 30 union councils in 10 upazilas were surveyed, with two-thirds of the unions 
being unions in which the FFE program was active and the remaining third being non-FFE unions.
5
With the advent of the PES program in July 2002, there was interest in comparing the impact of 
the PES with the FFE program, and IFPRI was commissioned to undertake a second evaluation study by 
the World Bank in 2003. Because of budgetary constraints, only 8 of the 10 original upazilas were 
surveyed, and it was also decided to follow only the original households within the survey unions. The 
combined effect of these changes reduced the household sample from 600 to 473 households in the 
second wave, although only 7 of these lost households should strictly be regarded as the result of attrition, 
as the other 120 households came from the two unions that were not surveyed in 2003. Although the same 
proportions of former FFE and non-FFE unions were maintained in 2003, as all rural unions were now 
eligible for the PES, the treatment-control design used by the previous evaluation could not be applied to 
evaluation of the PES program (Ahmed 2005). 
 As the 
focus of the FFE program was on economically disadvantaged areas, the sample of non-FFE unions was 
selected from neighboring economically disadvantaged areas. This means that the subsequent sample 
cannot be regarded as representative of rural Bangladesh as a whole, but it does broadly characterize the 
conditions in the poorest upazilas in the country. 
In late 2006/early 2007, the same households and unions that had been included in the 2003 wave 
were resurveyed as part of a larger Chronic Poverty Research Centre -IFPRI project entitled “Chronic 
Poverty and Poverty Dynamics in Rural Bangladesh.” Households from two other IFPRI evaluation 
studies on microfinance (1994) and agricultural technologies (1996) were also included in this study, 
increasing the surveys’ total sample size to 2,152 households. In this wave, adult male children who had 
left the original households and set up their own households were tracked as long as they had not 
migrated outside their home districts. In addition, anthropometric information for all present household 
members, GPS coordinates of households and facilities, and several specialized modules (on shocks and 
negative events as well as power and resources) were included in the household questionnaire. The 
2006/07 study aimed to integrate and sequence quantitative and qualitative methods in three phases: 
•  Phase I involved focus-group discussions with four groups (of poor and better-off women, 
plus poor and better-off men) in each village. The focus groups aimed to elicit perceptions of 
changes, group members’ perceptions of the interventions under study, and the degree to 
which these interventions affected people’s lives (compared to other events in the 
community). 
•  Phase II was a quantitative survey of the original households and new households that had 
split off from the original households but remained in the same district. The household survey 
took place from November 2006 to February 2007, the same agricultural season as the 
original surveys, with multitopic questionnaires designed to be comparable across sites and 
with the original questionnaires from the evaluation studies.  
                                                       
5 The 10 upazilas were selected with probability proportionate to size samples (using population data from the most recent 
census), and then two Food for Education (FFE) unions and one non-FFE union were selected in each union. Two villages were 
then randomly selected in each union, with 10 households with primary school–age children then randomly selected within each 
village. See Ahmed and del Ninno (2002) for further details.  
5 
•  Phase III consisted of a qualitative study based on life histories of 293 men and women in 
161 selected households in eight of the districts in the original quantitative study.
6
Further details about the sampling and initial findings from these three phases of the 2006/07 
survey can be found in Davis (2007), Quisumbing (2007), and Davis and Baulch (2009), respectively. 
Appendix Figure 1. provides a map of the locations of the upazilas surveyed. 
 The aim of 
this phase was to understand the processes and institutional contexts that influence individual 
and household livelihood trajectories. Fieldwork for this final phase of the study was 
undertaken between March and October 2007. 
Only the part of the 2006/07 household survey that was drawn from the original FFE study in 
2000 is analyzed in this paper. This consists of 511 households, consisting of 473 core households from 
the 2000 survey plus 38 households that had split from the core households between 2003 and 2006.
7
Two characteristics of the data that deserve highlighting are the percentage of villages with 
primary schools in the sample and panel ageing. First, of the 48 villages included in the education transfer 
panel, 41 had registered primary schools (all of which were coeducational), and 18 had two or more 
primary schools (including nine madrasahs with attached primary schools). All but 1 of these 41 villages 
had at least one primary school before 2000. Second, because the original 2000 sample was designed to 
include households with at least one primary-school-age child, the percentage of households with 
primary-school-age children declines (from 97.8 percent in 2000 to 97.7 percent in 2003 and 60.1 percent 
in 2006). This does not indicate a fall in the primary enrollment rate but rather the ageing of panel 
households. Net enrollment rates in primary school have, in fact, increased from 84.0 percent in 2000 to 
92.2 percent in 2006.
 
Since there were 480 households in the 2000 survey that could have been resampled, and 31 of these were 
not relocated in 2006, the attrition rate is 6.1 percent. Although this is a relatively low rate of attrition 
compared to those of panel surveys in other developing countries, Quisumbing’s (2007) multivariate 
analysis of attrition in the three sites indicates that attrition is not entirely random, with demographic 
variables and village dummies being predictors of attrition. 
8 Furthermore, primary Net Enrolment Rates (NERs) for girls are around 2.0 percent 
higher than for boys in both 2000 (85.2 percent vs. 82.8 percent) and 2006 (93.3 percent vs. 91.0 
percent).
9
Table 1 shows changes in the outcome variables, which I have derived from the panel survey for 
the period 2000–2006. As my interest is the impact of PES, the sample is restricted to those households 
with at least one primary-school-age child in 2006.
 
10
                                                       
6 In six of these eight districts, focus group discussions were carried out in Phase I.  
 Two levels of outcome variables are distinguished in 
Table 1 and throughout the remainder of this paper: household-level and individual-level variables. The 
household-level variables are much more numerous than the individual-level variables as they include 
variables such as expenditures and assets that can be measured meaningfully only at the household level. 
When such variables were measured in monetary units, they were first converted into real 2006/07 terms 
and then transformed into natural logarithms. They therefore have a percentage change interpretation (for 
example, per capita expenditures increased by 41 percent in real terms between 2000 and 2006). Changes 
in calorie and protein consumption, which are expressed as kilocalories and calories per day, are also 
changes in logs. To account for differences in household composition, changes per adult equivalent 
expenditures, calorie, and protein consumption are also calculated using the equivalence scale developed 
by Ahmed and Sharma (1996). Again, these changes are in log terms, so a percentage interpretation is 
7 Note that household splits were not followed between 2000 and 2003. 
8 For consistency with previous International Food Policy Research Institute reports we use 6 to 12 years old as the age 
range for calculating primary enrollment rates although the official age range for primary education is 6 to 10 years old. The 
World Bank’s lower estimates of primary NERS are based on using the official age range.  
9 This suggests that Bangladesh has achieved gender parity in education, at least at the primary level. These trends are 
consistent with those that have been observed in nationally representative household surveys, such as the Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys of 2000 and 2005 (World Bank 2008). 
10 Most of these households have several children of different ages.  
6 
possible. Land assets, which cannot be valued in 2000, are measured as the percentage change in land 
owned per household in decimals.
11 Finally, three household-level outcomes are included, which are 
summaries of individual-level outcomes: change in the percentage of stunting among children younger 
than 12, change in the percentage of children younger than 12 with low body mass indices (BMIs), and 
change in the percentage of school-aged children in the household enrolled in primary school.
12
Table 1. Change in outcome variables, 2000–2006 
 These are 
the outcomes that perhaps speak most directly to the objectives of PES and, along with protein 
consumption, are also the outcomes that show declines in their mean values, although none of these are 
statistically different from zero at conventional levels. The size of the decline in the percentage of 
children enrolled in primary school is nonetheless large and is linked to the phenomenon of panel ageing. 
Outcome Variable  n  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Household-level Outcomes 
Change in per capita expenditures  291  0.415  0.4621  –1.18  1.72 
Change in per capita food expenditures  291  0.390  0.4646  –1.38  1.68 
Change in per capita nonfood expenditures  289  0.637  0.7977  –2.50  2.81 
Change in adult equivalent expenditures  291  0.914  0.5059  –0.65  2.62 
Change in adult equivalent food expenditures  291  0.890  0.5213  –0.82  2.56 
Change in adult equivalent nonfood expenditures  289  1.138  0.8042  –1.86  3.51 
Change in per capita calorie consumption  290  0.034  0.3644  –1.13  0.92 
Change in per capita protein consumption  290  –0.289  0.4542  –1.60  0.99 
Change in adult equivalent calorie consumption  290  0.534  0.4430  –1.00  1.92 
            Change in adult equivalent protein consumption  290  0.212  0.5132  –1.36  1.62 
Change in percentage of stunting among children younger 
than 12  291  0.118  0.4386  –1.00  1.00 
            Change in percentage of low BMI among children younger 
than 12  291  0.076  0.3888  –1.00  1.00 
Change in percentage of children enrolled in primary school  291  –0.114  0.5447  –1.00  1.00 
Change in cultivable land  289  –0.467  1.6770  –5.47  6.42 
Change in value of livestock  289  0.339  3.5184  –10.23  10.23 
Change in value of jewelry  289  –0.183  3.8732  –9.40  11.16 
Change in value of nonland assets  289  0.198  1.1319  –3.59  4.79 
Change in value of consumer durables  289  0.191  1.1722  –3.56  4.61 
Change in value of agricultural durables  289  0.314  3.6591  –10.17  10.32 
Change in value of nonagricultural durables  289  0.447  3.5292  –9.50  10.31 
Individual-level outcomes 
Grade progression  685  2.619  1.9465  0.00  7.00 
Change in height for age  276  0.036  1.1237  –3.85  3.41 
Change in BMI z-score  273  –0.055  1.0610  –3.87  2.91 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: BMI = body mass index. 
                                                       
11 One hundred decimals equals one acre of land. This variable was also logged with one decimal added to all values to 
avoid having  to take the log of zero values for landless households. 
12 Stunting is defined as height for age less than –2 standard deviations below the World Health Organization (WHO) 
reference standard, and low body mass index is defined as a score less than 18.5 (thin) using the WHO reference standards for 5- 
to 19-year-olds (De Onis et al. 2007).  
7 
In contrast, the three individual outcome variables (grade progression, change in height for age, 
and change in BMI) are measured in absolute units and do not have a percentage interpretation. Grade 
progression shows the number of grades a child of primary-school age advanced between 2000 and 2006. 
The mean number of grades progressed was 2.62, but a large number of children (128) did not advance 
any school grades, whereas a handful (5 children) advanced seven grades.
13 Changes in height for age and 
BMI are for children younger than 13 years old in 2000 and are expressed as absolute changes in their z-
scores.
14
Finally, it should be noted that although these trends in outcome values are suggestive, they 
cannot be used to conclude anything about the efficacy of educational transfers in Bangladesh, because of 
the presence of numerous other confounding factors (in particular, generalized economic growth) as well 
as systematic differences between beneficiary and nonbeneficiary groups. It is for this reason that the 
matching methods described in the next section are employed. 
 There are two reasons for the considerably smaller number of observations for these variables. 
First, children needed to be older than 5 years old in 2000 for their BMIs to be assessed. Second, children 
had to be present in the household at the time of the interview to be measured, whereas their schooling 
level could be ascertained by talking to another household member. The z-scores for height for age for 
these children show a slight increase (of 3.6 percent) whereas those for BMI show a small decrease (5.5 
percent); again, these differences are not statistically different from zero at conventional levels. 
 
                                                       
13 Note that grade progression relates to children who were of primary school age (6 to 12 years) at some point during 2000 
and 2006. Thus, mean grade progression is reduced by children who were less than 6 years old in 2000 and entered primary 
school in later years.  
14 The new WHO reference groups for children 5 to 18 years old are used for calculating these z-scores.  
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4.  METHODOLOGY 
The core of the evaluation problem is how to assess the counterfactual problem: What would have 
happened to beneficiaries in the absence of the intervention or treatment (Baker 2000; Khandker, 
Koolwal, and Samad 2010; Todd 2006). Random assignment of the treatment to a pool of equally eligible 
individuals or households followed by a comparison of outcomes for the treatment and control groups 
before and after treatment is probably the simplest way to solve the evaluation problem (Duflo and 
Kremer 2003). This approach is at the heart of the randomized control trial approach to evaluating 
development interventions popularized by the Jamil Latif Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. However, randomized control trials are not appropriate for evaluating all 
interventions either because of sectorwide effects or because it is politically or institutionally infeasible to 
randomize the allocation of the intervention. In a countrywide program such as PES, random allocation of 
beneficiaries to treatment and control groups is clearly infeasible. 
The approach used in this paper therefore rests on a quasi-experimental or observation approach, 
which constructs comparable treatment and comparison groups using covariate and propensity score 
matching. Through comparisons with experimental estimators, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and 
Heckman et al. (1998) show that propensity score matching (PSM) provides reliable, low-bias difference-
in-difference estimates of program impact provided that (1) the same data source is used for participants 
and nonparticipants, (2) participants and nonparticipants have access to the same markets, and (3) the data 
include meaningful explanatory variables capable of identifying program participation. Our Bangladesh 
panel data meet all these requirements. In addition, they contain an unusually wide range of outcome 
variables and information about the household-level variables (household demographic, main occupation, 
land ownership, and sharecropping) that determines the eligibility of households to receive PES to be 
assessed directly. 
The matching procedure involves several steps. For household- and individual-level outcomes, 
the propensity scores for participation in PES (or FFE) are estimated using a probit model that includes 
both determinants of program eligibility and factors that affect the outcome. Heckman, Ichimura, and 
Todd (1998) emphasize that the quality of the match rests on ensuring that matches are formed only 
where the densities of the propensity scores overlap between treatment and comparison observations, 
which is known as the “common support.” Common support can be improved by dropping treatment 
observations whose estimated propensity scores are greater than the maximum or less than the minimum 
of the comparison group’s propensity scores. Similarly, comparison group observations with a propensity 
score below the minimum or above the maximum of the treatment observations are usually dropped.
15
Having calculated the propensity scores, treatment and comparison observations were matched 
using two methods: local linear matching and nearest-neighbor matching. Nearest-neighbor matching 
pairs observations from the treatment and comparison groups with similar propensity scores. As nearest-
neighbor matching allows an observation to be used as a match more than once, it typically provides 
larger sample sizes for the comparison group than local linear matching. Nearest-neighbor matching was 
implemented using Stata’s NNMATCH command (Abadie et al. 2004), specifying five matches in the 
comparison group for each treatment observation. In contrast to nearest-neighbor matching, local linear 
matching performs well in samples with low densities of the propensity score in the interior of the 
propensity score distribution. Although local linear regression matching typically requires more 
observations than nearest-neighbor matching, it serves as a useful robustness check. Local linear 
matching was implemented using a tricube kernel using Stata’s PSMATCH2 command (Leuven and 
Sianesi 2003). 
 
Two complications with applying matching methods for the evaluation of the medium-term 
impact of PES using the Bangladesh panel data should be noted. First, although the eligibility criteria for 
                                                       
15 The distribution of propensity scores for the comparison group often lies to the left of the distribution for the treatment 
group for targeted social programs. As a result, the highest propensity scores tend to come from treatment observations, whereas 
the lowest are dominated by comparison observations. This pattern indicates effective targeting.  
9 
receiving FFE and PES are similar, and the PES eligibility criteria remained consistent between 2003 and 
2006, the requirement that households contain at least one primary-school-age child means that the 
sample of treatment and comparison households varies over time. Simply because children age, many of 
the households that would have been eligible to receive PES in 2000 (had it existed then) would not be 
eligible to receive PES in 2006—even if all other household characteristics remained constant between 
the two years.
16
In closing, it should be noted that several other approaches have been considered for evaluating 
the impact of education transfers. Initially, the research team had thought that regression discontinuity 
design, which compares the outcomes of individuals or households just above a threshold with those just 
below a threshold, might be a promising approach. However, regression discontinuity design works best 
when sample sizes are relatively large and when there is a sharp discontinuity between those who are 
eligible to receive the treatment and those who are not. The sample lacks a clear breaking point when I 
assess each of the eligibility criteria against households’ PES status and is also relatively small. 
Regression discontinuity design therefore does not seem a promising approach in this context. 
 To circumvent this problem, this paper therefore defines the treatment group as 
households that were eligible to receive the PES in both 2000 and 2006 and the comparison group as 
households that were ineligible to receive the PES (despite having at least one primary-school-age child) 
in both years. This means that households that moved from being eligible to being ineligible to receive 
transfers (or vice versa) are excluded from the sample, which further reduces the sample of households 
that can be used for the matching by almost a half to 258 households. Second, although our first panel 
wave in 2000 predates the implementation of the PES in July 2002, in two-thirds of our sample union 
councils, some households were FFE beneficiaries. This means that matched difference-in-difference 
estimates in these unions identify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the PES relative to 
FFE. To isolate the impact of PES alone, a sample consisting of households from non-FFE unions plus 
those households from FFE unions that never were eligible to receive the educational transfers is also 
constructed. Although this further reduces the sample size to 228 households, this second sample does 
allow the calculation of ATTs that are uncontaminated by the effects of the earlier FFE program.  
An alternative approach is that of panel regressions using continuous outcome variables, with the 
treatment’s being instrumented to control for its endogeneity. This approach has the advantage that it does 
not require households whose eligibility status changes during the panel to be excluded from the sample. 
In theory, it can also distinguish between the effects of FFE and PES in the three panel years. However, 
the efficiency of the instrumental variables approach relies on selection of instrumental variables that are 
highly correlated with the receipt of FFE or PES but uncorrelated with the outcome variables. 
Unfortunately, the nature of the five PES eligibility criteria makes it unlikely that this orthogonality 
condition will be met. 
 
 
                                                       
16 For example, a near-landless household whose youngest child attended grade 1 of primary school in the 2000/01 academic 
year would no longer be eligible to receive PES in 2006/07 if the child had completed primary school on track in 2004/05.  
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5.  DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF EDUCATION TRANSFERS 
As noted above, the PES can be received by households with primary-school-age children only. 
Officially, the age range for primary-school enrollment in Bangladesh is 6 to 10 years old, implying that 
primary-school children should enroll in grade 1 at the age of 6 and complete grade 5 when they are 
between 10 and 11 years old. However, Figure 2 shows that 15.5 percent and 35.3 percent of the children 
receiving PES in 2003 and 2006, respectively, were older than 11 years old. With some 15- and 16-year-
old children receiving the PES, it is clear that the age criterion for receiving PES is not at all strictly 
enforced. It seems that the late age of pupils’ enrollment in primary school in rural areas has therefore 
been accommodated rather than countered by the PES. 





Source: Author’s creation.  
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How well does the PES reach the 40 percent of the poorest households that it is intended to 
target? Figure 3 shows the proportion of all households receiving educational transfers in 2000, 2003, and 
2006, by expenditure quintile. Two trends are apparent from this figure. First, the shapes of the benefit 
incidence curves for 2000 and 2006 are generally downward sloping, indicating that the FFE and PES are 
slightly progressive. However, in 2003, the year after the PES was introduced, the middle quintile 
received a higher share of the PES than the poorest two quintiles. Furthermore, the shapes of the curves 
for all three years are relatively flat and decline sharply only in the richest quintile. Under effective 
targeting, one would expect these benefit incidence curves to decline more sharply in the top three 
quintiles. Second, at all deciles, a smaller share of households receives the educational transfers in 
successive survey rounds. In part, this reflects ageing of the households within the panel (all but 2 percent 
of whom had primary-school-age children in 2000) but may also reflect reductions in the overall numbers 
of PES recipients over time. 
Figure 3. Proportion of households receiving educational transfers 
 
Source :Author’s creation. 
Note: FFE = Food for Education; PES = Primary Education Stipend. 
It is also interesting to note that in 2003, although mothers were registered to receive PES in 98 
percent of households, mothers actually collected the stipend in 92 percent of households. (Unfortunately, 
similar data are not available for the 2006 survey wave.) 
It is conventional to distinguish between two errors of targeting: errors of inclusion and errors of 
exclusion (also known as leakages and undercoverage).
17
Table 2
 Using the five criteria for the stipend outlined in 
section 2,   and Table 3 examine the targeting of the PES program. These tables show that errors of 
inclusion are greater than errors of exclusion. This is consistent with the budgetary restrictions that restrict 
the number of children that school management committees can select to receive PES. Nevertheless, 17.1 
percent of households receiving PES in 2003 were not entitled to receive it, and this percentage had risen 
to 27.4 percent by 2006. (Note also that the decline in errors of exclusion between 2003 and 2006 
indicates the ageing of children in the panel rather than improved targeting.). 
                                                       
17 Following Cornia and Stewart (1995), they are also known as E and F errors, where the E stands for excessive coverage 
and F, the failure to reach the target population.  
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Table 2. Targeting of the Primary Education Stipend (PES) program, 2003 
PES Status, 2003 
Eligible for PES, 2003 
Yes   No  Total 
Beneficiary  82.9  17.1  100.0 
Nonbeneficiary  55.4  44.6  100.0 
Total  65.2  34.8  100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Table 3. Targeting of the Primary Education Stipend (PES) program, 2006 
PES Status, 2006 
Eligible for PES, 2006 
Yes   No  Total 
Beneficiary  72.6  27.4  100.0 
Nonbeneficiary  31.6  68.4  100.0 
Total  40.1  59.9  100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
The above findings are consistent with other studies that confirm the weak targeting and lightness 
of the conditionality of PES. For example, Hossain (2009) argues that schools often “adjust” the 
eligibility criteria and school attendance records to ensure that “deserving” students receive PES.
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We now turn to examining how selected outcome variables differ by PES beneficiary status 
(
 The 
weak targeting of the PES is further exacerbated by the fact that its decentralised targeting requires that 
school management committees pick the same percentage of pupils to receive the stipend, whatever the 
overall level of poverty within a locality (Al-Samarrai, 2009). 
Table 4). As in Table 1, the sample in this table is restricted to households with at least one primary-
school-age child in 2006. For all but four of the household-level outcomes, the changes in the outcomes 
variables are higher for PES beneficiaries than for non-PES beneficiaries. However, as the p (probability) 
values for the unpaired t-test reported in the last column show, only two of the differences in household-
level outcomes are statistically different from zero using conventional level of significance. These two 
outcomes are the change in stunting among children younger than 13 years old and the percentage of 
children enrolled in primary school. However, for the change in stunting, the change among PES 
beneficiary households is greater than for nonbeneficiary households—most probably because PES 
beneficiaries tend to be slightly poorer than nonbeneficiaries. For the percentage of children enrolled in 
primary school, what makes the difference between PES beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries significant is 
not the size of the increase among PES beneficiaries but that the nonbeneficiary group had around 20 
percent fewer children enrolled in primary school in 2006 than in 2000. If enrollments are disaggregated 
by grade as in Figure 4, there is actually little visual difference in enrollments by PES status. Although a 
substantial increase in the proportion of children enrolled in grade 1 between 2000 and 2006 together with 
subsequent progression through the grades can be seen in this figure, there is little difference between the 
plots for PES beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. It is therefore difficult to attribute the increase in 
enrollment to PES. In short, these crude difference-in-difference estimates show PES has limited impact 
on outcomes at the household level.  
                                                       
18 An evaluation of the PES program in 2005 found that attendance figures were exaggerated for a third of eligible stipend 
holders. In addition, 7 percent of beneficiaries received payments despite failing the last annual examination (Al-Samarrai 2009).  
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Table 4. Change in outcome variables by Primary Education Stipend (PES) status 
Outcome Variable  PES Beneficiaries  Nonbeneficiaries 
 p Value  n  Mean  Standard Deviation  n  Mean   Standard Deviation 
Household-level Outcomes    
Change in per capita expenditures  98  0.404  0.433  193  0.420  0.477  .777 
Change in per capita food expenditures  98  0.356  0.467  193  0.407  0.464  .383 
Change in per capita nonfood expenditures  98  0.680  0.728  191  0.615  0.832  .497 
Change in adult equivalent expenditures  98  0.949  0.494  193  0.897  0.512  .401 
Change in adult equivalent food expenditures  98  0.901  0.537  193  0.884  0.515  .791 
Change in adult equivalent nonfood expenditures  98  1.225  0.731  191  1.093  0.837  .171 
Change in per capita calorie consumption  98  0.036  0.386  192  0.033  0.354  .945 
Change in per capita protein consumption  98  –0.312  0.443  192  –0.277  0.461  .536 
Change in adult equivalent calorie consumption  98  0.581  0.459  192  0.511  0.434  .215 
Change in adult equivalent protein consumption  98  0.233  0.514  192  0.201  0.514  .617 
Change in stunting among children younger than 13  98  0.222  0.447  193  0.065  0.426  .005 
Change in low BMI among children younger than 13  98  0.076  0.417  193  0.076  0.375  .998 
Change in children enrolled in primary school  98  0.075  0.499  193  –0.209  0.543  .000 
Change on cultivable land  98  –0.316  1.448  191  –0.545  1.782  .241 
Change in value of livestock  98  0.603  3.115  191  0.204  3.709  .336 
Change in value of jewelry  98  –0.080  4.208  191  –0.236  3.700  .755 
Change in value of nonland assets  98  0.257  1.031  191  0.169  1.182  .513 
Change in value of consumer durables  98  0.319  1.115  191  0.126  1.198  .175 
Change in value of agricultural durables  98  0.454  3.542  191  0.243  3.725  .638 
Change in value of nonagricultural durables  98  0.197  3.364  191  0.574  3.613  .380 
Individual-level outcomes    
Grade progression  270  2.419  1.912  415  2.749  1.960  .029 
Change in height for age  99  0.125  0.867  177  –0.013  1.244  .282 
Change in BMI z-score  101  –0.055  1.062  172  –0.056  1.064  .995 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Note: BMI = Body Mass Index. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of children enrolled in school, by Primary Education Stipend (PES) 
beneficiary status 
 
Source: Constructed by author.  
Moving on to individual-level outcomes, the only one of the three outcomes considered that is 
statistically significant from zero is that for grade progression (the number of grades a child of primary-
school age in 2006 has advanced). However, like the percentage of children enrolled in primary school, 
the change in this variable between 2000 and 2006 is larger for the nonbeneficiary than the beneficiary 
group.  
For individual-level anthropometric outcomes, height for age z-scores improve among PES 
beneficiaries but worsen among nonbeneficiaries, whereas BMI z-scores decline for both groups. 
However, both of these changes are small and are not significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels. 
A final point that should be noted is that the number of households receiving PES in 2006 is less 
than half of the number of beneficiary households in 2003. This phenomenon, which is related to panel 
ageing, makes it vital to ensure that households with similar characteristics are compared when 
constructing difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of the PES. Otherwise many of the apparent 
changes in the outcome variables could simply be due to differences in households’ characteristics 
(including PES status’ changing between panel waves). Such comparisons are facilitated by the matching 




6.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section contains the paper’s main results on the impact of PES on a range of individual- and 
household-level outcomes using the methodology described in section 4. The outcomes selected go 
beyond the conventional measures used to assess the performance of educational interventions and are 
broadly comparable with those in the companion paper by Kumar and Quisumbing (forthcoming) on the 
long-term impact of agricultural technology. So too is the matching methodology, which uses household 
characteristics at baseline (2000) plus shock variables to construct treatment and comparison groups. ATT 
is then used to show the impact of PES eligibility on different outcome variables. ATT is estimated using 
a standard difference-in-difference methodology in which the difference in the outcome variable between 
the treatment and comparison groups in 2000 (difference 1) is deducted from the same difference in 2006 
(difference 2).  
Figure 5 shows the estimated densities of the propensity scores for the treatment and comparison 
groups based on matching, using the following baseline characteristics: age of the household head, 
education of the household head, household size, and the proportion of men and women aged 20 to 34 and 
35 to 54 years old in the household (Appendix Table 1). Three shock variables are also included, showing 
the number of floods the community experienced between 2000 and 2006 together with whether dowries 
were paid or any members of the household experienced serious illness during the same period. Note that 
although payment of dowries (which includes other wedding expenditures) is not strictly a shock (since 
they can be anticipated in advance), studies using the same data attest to its negative impact on 
households’ livelihood trajectories (Davis and Baulch 2009). Selected upazila dummies are also included. 
This specification of matching covariates meets the balancing condition but decreases the sample from 
258 to either 206 or 208 households depending on whether the outcome variable includes nonfood 
expenditures (which are missing for two households in 2000).  
Figure 5. Estimated propensity score at the household leve  
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: PES = Primary Education Stipend.  
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Table 5 presents estimated ATTs based on this common sample for a range of outcome variables 
at the household level using nearest-neighbor matching. For ease of interpretation most of the outcome 
variables are expressed either in natural logarithms (expenditures and asset values) or as percentages. 
Although the signs of the impacts of PES are mostly as expected (meaning positive on expenditures, 
calorie and protein consumption, and assets) most of them are not statistically different from zero at 
conventional levels. The three exceptions are the percentage of stunted children in the household, the 
change in the value of consumer durables, and the change in cultivable land. The PES program shows 
positive and statistically significant impacts on the first two of these variables but a negative effect on 
land. The effect of PES on stunting, although apparently strong, is not robust and disappears when the 
alternative matching method of locally linear regressions is used. This is also the case for the change in 
cultivable land, which one would expect to decline to some extent over the period due to the practice of 
partible land inheritance in Bangladesh. The effect on consumer durables is robust to matching methods 
and suggests that although PES may have had only marginal effects on current consumption levels, it 
does protect households from income variability due to shocks, thereby allowing assets to be gradually 
built up over time.
20
Table 5. Household-level impacts of the Primary Education Stipend, 2000–2006 
 However, by far the biggest surprise from Table 5 is that PES does not have a 
discernible impact on primary-school enrollments at the household level. 
Outcome Variable 
Nearest-neighbor Matching 
n  ATT  p value 
Change in per capita expenditures  167  0.1058  .240 
Change in per capita food expenditures  167  0.1341  .150 
Change in per capita nonfood expenditures  167  0.0510  .691 
Change in adult equivalent expenditures  167  0.1611  .096 
Change in adult equivalent food expenditures  167  0.1894  .054 
Change in adult equivalent nonfood expenditures  167  0.1064  .431 
Change in per capita calorie consumption  166  0.0502  .442 
Change in per capita protein consumption  166  0.1311  .138 
Change in adult equivalent calorie consumption  166  0.1100  .170 
Change in adult equivalent protein consumption  166  0.1909  .058 
Change in percentage of stunted children  167  0.1897  .018 
Change in percentage of low–body mass index children  167  0.0050  .939 
Change in primary school enrollment  167  –0.0748  .427 
Change on cultivable land  167  –0.4325  .027 
Change in value of livestock  167  –0.0237  .968 
Change in value of jewelry  167  0.2610  .695 
Change in value of nonland assets  167  0.1626  .361 
Change in value of consumer durables  167  0.3492  .045 
Change in value of agricultural durables  167  0.8044  .223 
Change in value of nonagricultural durables  167  –0.6303  .299 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: ATT = average treatment effect on the treated. 
As noted in the Methodology section estimating ATTs using the full sample of households 
identifies the impact of the PES program relative to the FFE program in unions in which FFE previously 
operated. So in Table 6, the sample is restricted to non-FFE unions in 2000 plus households living in FFE 
unions that were never eligible to receive PES. Unfortunately, since only a third of the unions in the 2000 
                                                       
20 This finding is consistent with the findings of a recent International Food Policy Research Institute study of the impact of 
the Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia (Gilligan, Hoddinott, and Taffesse 2008).  
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sample were non-FFE unions and many of noneligible households living in FFE unions did not have 
primary-school-age children, the sample is reduced by more than half (to just 70 households). This 
sample size is too small for locally linear regression matching to identify ATT. However, nearest-
neighbor matching (with replacement) is able to identify ATT in this case. As can be seen from Table 6, 
most ATTs are not statistically significant from zero. However, the change in the percentage of children 
(younger than 12 years old) with low BMI is statistically significant at the 5 percent level and negative, 
suggesting that by 2006 PES had led to a one-fifth decline in low-BMI children. In addition, ATT for the 
change of the value of consumer durables is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
However, again the majority of ATTs (including the one for primary-school enrollments) are not 
statistically different from zero. 
Table 6. Household-level impacts of the Primary Education Stipend in restricted sample, 2000–2006  
Outcome Variable 
Nearest-neighbor Matching 
n  ATT  p value 
Change in per capita expenditures  70  0.1828  0.134 
Change in per capita food expenditures  70  0.2106  0.103 
Change in per capita nonfood expenditures  70  0.1824  0.359 
Change in adult equivalent expenditures  70  0.1253  0.344 
Change in adult equivalent food expenditures  70  0.1532  0.266 
Change in adult equivalent nonfood expenditures  70  0.1250  0.548 
Change in per capita calorie consumption  70  0.1293  0.177 
Change in per capita protein consumption  70  0.2056  0.106 
Change in adult equivalent calorie consumption  70  0.0718  0.525 
Change in adult equivalent protein consumption  70  0.1482  0.287 
Change in percentage of stunted children  70  0.2372  0.064 
Change in percentage of low–body mass index 
children  70  –0.1954  0.046 
Change in primary school enrollment  70  0.1696  0.241 
Change on cultivable land  70  –0.3468  0.300 
Change in value of livestock  70  –0.0848  0.921 
Change in value of jewelry  70  0.0000  1.000 
Change in value of nonland assets  70  0.1471  0.540 
Change in value of consumer durables  70  0.4689  0.073 
Change in value of agricultural durables  70  0.4193  0.648 
Change in value of nonagricultural durables  70  0.2059  0.819 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: ATT = average treatment effect on the treated. 
We now move to considering the impact of PES’s individual-level outcomes. The common 
support samples at the individual level are larger than at the household level because some households 
have more than one primary-school-age child, and nearly all had children younger than 12 years old in 
2000.
21
                                                       
21 Note that anthropometric indicators were collected from boys younger than 13, plus females younger than 19 and all 
mothers in the 2000 survey. Anthropometry on all available household members was collected in the 2006 survey. 
 This allows more overlap (common support) between those eligible and not eligible for PES, 
which in turn allows more precision in estimation of ATT (Figure 6 and Appendix Table 2). It is also 
possible for these individual outcome variables to be disaggregated by gender.  
18 
 
Figure 6. Estimated propensity scores at the individual level 
    
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: PES = Primary Education Stipend. 
Table 7 shows the individual-level impacts of the PES between 2000 and 2006 for all children of 
primary-school age in 2006, and for boys and girls considered separately. For the anthropometric 
indicators, the effects of PES are all positive but not statistically different from zero. However, for grade 
progression, ATT is negative and statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level when boys and 
girls are considered together. This is a relatively weak result given the size of the sample, but the sign and 
size of the treatment effect is consistent with the half a grade difference in grade progression between 
PES and non-PES beneficiaries noted earlier. The negative sign is also consistent with the decline in 
primary enrollment rates observed in the unmatched sample. 
Table 7. Individual-level impacts of the Primary Education Stipend, 2000–2006 
  Nearest-neighbor matching 
Outcome Variable  n  SATT  p value 
Boys and Girls 
Grade progression  668  –0.2531  .090 
Change in height for age  276  0.1510  .341 
Change in BMI z-score  274  0.1803  .161 
Boys Only 
Grade progression  341  –0.240  .282 
Change in height for age  122  –0.093  .510 
Change in BMI z-score  121  0.268  .136 
Girls Only 
Grade progression  327  –0.231  .242 
Change in height for age  154  0.336  .183 
Change in BMI z-score  153  0.145  .412 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: SATT = Sample Average Treatment Effect; BMI = Body Mass Index.  
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As was the case with the household-level outcomes, the number of observations is too small to 
allow ATT to be estimated when the sample is restricted to non-FFE unions and nonbeneficiaries in FFE 
unions with locally linear regression matching. However, ATT can be estimated using nearest-neighbor 
matching for this sample and produces the results shown in Table 8. The results, which remove the 
confounding impact of FFE for some households, show PES continuing to have a negative impact on 
grade progression for boys and girls together, with the decline in grade progression among boys being 
twice that for girls. The likely explanation for this difference is that unlike girls, boys from poor 
households are ineligible to receive stipends at the secondary-school level. Once, they reach the age of 11 
or 12, employment opportunities for boys in rural areas are also much more abundant than they are for 
girls. A significant increase in height for age and BMI for boys and girls considered together is also 
detected in Table 8. However, the change in BMI is statistically significant only for boys, whereas the 
change in height for age is statistically significant only for girls. The latter finding is particularly 
surprising as stunting tends to develop before school enrollment age and is hard, if not impossible, to 
reverse (Golden 1994). 
Table 8. Individual-level impacts of the Primary Education Stipend, 2000–2006 
  Nearest-neighbor Matching 
Outcome Variable  n  SATT  p value 
Boys and Girls 
Grade progression  280  –0.4374  .037 
Change in height for age  111  0.5755  .009 
Change in BMI z-score  111  0.5074  .008 
Boys Only 
Grade progression  155  –0.5466  .067 
Change in height for age  57  0.1252  .592 
Change in BMI z-score  57  0.8194  .008 
Girls Only 
Grade progression  125  –0.2154  .453 
Change in height for age  54  1.3104  .000 
Change in BMI z-score  54  0.3174  .195 
Source: Author’s calculations. 





7.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has analyzed the medium term impacts of Bangladesh’s Primary Education Stipend program. 
Using propensity score matching methods the PES program is shown to have negligible impacts on a 
range of outcome variables at both the household and individual level, once the factors which make 
treatment and comparison group households different are controlled for.  Between 2000 and 2006, the 
PES program is shows few signs of improving primary school enrolments, households’ expenditures, or 
calorie, or protein consumption at the household level. This is consistent with the declining value of the 
PES (which has remained fixed in nominal terms since 2003) and with Ahmed’s (2005) finding on the 
short-term impact of the PES on food consumption within the household. Looking at a wider range of 
asset variables reveals wider impacts of the PES program on stunting, ownership of consumer durables 
and land over the medium term.  While these results are not particularly robust, they suggest that the PES 
may have provided beneficiary households’ with some protection from income variability due to shocks, 
which may in turn allow them to gradually build-up assets over the medium term. 
At the individual level, covariate and propensity score matching methods show that the PES has a 
statistically significant impact on grade progression but that it is paradoxically lower among PES 
beneficiaries than non-PES beneficiaries. The negative impact on grade progression is strongest among 
boys from poor households who, unlike girls, are ineligible to receive stipends at the secondary level. 
There are also some signs of impact on height for age and the body mass index among children of 
primary-school age, with boys being more likely to experience improvements in their BMIs and girls 
being more likely to improve their height for age z-scores. 
Overall, however, the medium-term impacts of the PES are remarkably small for a program of its 
size. The PES’s well-known problems of poor targeting (Ahmed 2005; World Bank 2008), in particular 
its lack of coverage combined with its lack of geographical targeting, and the declining value of the cash 
transfer involved seem to be the most plausible reasons for this lack of impact. For some households, the 
PES even may have come to be regarded as another form of regular assistance. Since the PES program 
was renewed for another five-year period in July 2008, it would be timely to review the program’s 
targeting mechanisms and, in particular, whether it would be more efficient to target larger cash transfers 
to smaller numbers of the poorest households.
22
                                                       
22 Another policy option would be to replace cash transfers with food transfers. Although a return to FFE has certain 
attractive features (including its countercyclical and self-targeting nature), the high and variable costs of food transfers plus the 
substantial leakages associated with their distribution make it an unattractive option to most policymakers.  
 If this can be done, the PES program still has great 
potential to interrupt the intergenerational transfer of poverty for millions of Bangladeshi children.  
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURE AND TABLES 
Figure A.1. Locations of the education transfer survey sites 
 
Source: Data Analysis and Technical Assistance Ltd.  
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Table A.1. Probit estimates of the propensity score at the household level 
   Coefficient  Standard Error  z  P>|z|  95% Confidence Interval 
Age of head  -0.391  0.131  -2.970  0.003  -0.649  -0.133 
Age of head squared  0.004  0.001  2.750  0.006  0.001  0.006 
Education of head  -0.145  0.028  -5.210  0.000  -0.200  -0.090 
Proportion of males 20-34  -0.006  0.015  -0.370  0.709  -0.035  0.024 
Proportion of females 20-34  -0.052  0.024  -2.140  0.033  -0.100  -0.004 
Proportion of males 35-54  0.039  0.016  2.380  0.017  0.007  0.071 
Proportion of females 35-54  -0.030  0.025  -1.190  0.234  -0.080  0.019 
Number of floods  -0.001  0.003  -0.270  0.787  -0.006  0.005 
Illness  0.203  0.207  0.980  0.327  -0.202  0.608 
Dowry wedding  -0.070  0.223  -0.320  0.752  -0.507  0.366 
Household size  -0.138  0.065  -2.130  0.033  -0.264  -0.011 
Mohadevpur upazila  -0.912  0.303  -3.010  0.003  -1.506  -0.319 
Nilphamari upazila  -0.676  0.330  -2.050  0.040  -1.322  -0.030 
Household size  -0.138  0.065  -2.130  0.033  -0.264  -0.011 
Mohadevpur upazila  -0.912  0.303  -3.010  0.003  -1.506  -0.319 
Nilphamari upazila  -0.676  0.330  -2.050  0.040  -1.322  -0.030 
Constant  11.907  3.168  3.760  0.000  5.697  18.116 
Number of observations   =    232           
Lr chi2(13)             =      69.630           
Prob > chi2             =       0.000           
Pseudo r2                =       0.242                
Source: Estimated by author. 
 
Table A.2. Probit estimates of the propensity score at the individual level 
   Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  z  P>|z|  95% confidence interval 
Sex of child  0.015  0.103  0.150  0.881  -0.187  0.218 
Age of child  -0.086  0.019  -4.640  0.000  -0.123  -0.050 
Highest grade  -0.001  0.002  -0.840  0.399  -0.004  0.002 
Head’s education  -0.082  0.014  -5.920  0.000  -0.109  -0.055 
Num of floods  -0.004  0.001  -2.910  0.004  -0.007  -0.001 
Illnesses  0.084  0.107  0.780  0.433  -0.125  0.293 
Dowry-wedding  -0.432  0.106  -4.080  0.000  -0.640  -0.225 
Constant  1.378  0.285  4.830  0.000  0.818  1.937 
Number of observations   =    672         
LR chi2(13)             =     92.200       
Prob > chi2              =      0.000       
Pseudo R2                =      0.101          
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